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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we conclude that when limited partners 
sold their interests to their financially strapped partnership, 
the transaction was a constructive fraudulent conveyance, 
and as such it was properly declared void by the 
bankruptcy judge. Because the ruling by the bankruptcy 
judge restored the former partners to their previous status 
of equity investors, it was unnecessary for the bankruptcy 
judge to rule on the matter of subordination, advanced as 
an alternative theory of recovery. We will affirm the 
judgment as to the fraudulent conveyance and vacate the 
ruling on subordination raised in the cross-appeal. 
 
This is an adversary proceeding brought by the Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Limited 
Partnership IV against D. C. Guelich Explosive Co., Inc. 
and other former limited partners referred to collectively 
here as the Buncher Group.1 In 1988, Rodney Bohn 
organized GenFarm IV as a limited partnership with himself 
as sole general partner for the purpose of establishing and 
operating an experimental dairy farm in Florida. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In the Bankruptcy Court the Buncher Group included the Buncher 
Company, Financial Institutional Funding, Inc., John T. Stabile, and 
Richard J. Santucci. Financial Institutional, Santucci and Guelich have 
since settled their disputes with the Committee and are no longer parties 
in this dispute. 
 
                                2 
  
partnership filed a petition under Chapter 11 in June of 
1995; and all of the assets were scheduled to be sold to 
Ebony Bull Capital Co., an entity controlled by Bohn. The 
Buncher Group objected to the sale price as inadequate, 
but withdrew its opposition upon payment of $300,000, 
now held in escrow, and a promissory note in the amount 
of $700,000 from Ebony Bull. 
 
In August 1992, Guelich, the Buncher Group, and 
GenFarm IV filed several law suits in state courts against 
Ebony Bull and Bohn to remove him as general partner and 
recover damages. The allegations against Bohn are 
described in detail in the following excerpt from the state 
trial judge's opinion overruling preliminary objections: 
 
        "Plaintiffs [GenFarm IV, Guelich, and the Buncher 
       Group] claim that Mr. Bohn and Ebony Bull have 
       engaged in various acts of fraud and misrepresentation 
       to the detriment of the limited partners. They allege 
       that prior to the formation of the partnership, Mr. 
       Bohn represented that the genetics program was in 
       place on other farms even though he knew that it was 
       not yet viable; that he failed to describe unfavorable 
       information that he had received concerning the 
       operations of other dairy farms which he was operating 
       through Ebony Bull; that he purchased cows for 
       GenFarm IV from his other farms for substantial sums 
       of money even though they had no value; that he 
       purchased semen from his other farms that was never 
       used; that he chose a site for GenFarm IV which he 
       knew to have environmental problems without 
       furnishing this information to the limited partners; that 
       he obtained the limited partners' approval for 
       additional borrowing by misrepresenting the condition 
       of the business and overstating its value; that he made 
       unauthorized payments to Ebony Bull and other 
       entities which he operated; and that he engaged in 
       fraudulent activities in connection with March 1990 
       and November 1991 transactions with banks that 
       resulted in a refinancing of the partnership's 
       indebtedness and increased indebtedness. Mr. Bohn 
       denies these allegations -- he contends that plaintiffs 
       cannot produce evidence showing that he breached any 
       fiduciary duties." 
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GenFarm Limited Partnership IV v. Ebony Bull Capital Corp., 
141 P.L.J. 190, 191 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas 1993). 
 
The parties settled the state court suits in June 1993 
with each party agreeing to release all claims against the 
others. The settlement called for a closing transaction on 
October 4, 1993. Bohn had the option to step down and 
turn over his interests in the partnership, or remain as 
general partner and purchase the interests of Guelich and 
the Buncher Group. He chose the latter, but assigned to 
GenFarm IV his right to purchase. At the closing, GenFarm 
IV bought the limited partnership interests for $3.5 million 
in cash and a note secured by a second-priority mortgage 
on substantially all the partnership assets. On that same 
day, GenFarm IV sold the interests it had purchased from 
the Buncher Group and Guelich, together with minor 
limited partnership interests that it had previously 
acquired, to Bohn and Ebony Bull for $1.705 million. 
 
Simultaneously, GenFarm IV refinanced its obligations to 
its bank. Following the closing, GenFarm IV increased the 
herd size, but the following summer it began selling cows in 
order to pay expenses. The partnership continued its 
downward financial spiral, culminating in the Chapter 11 
petition.2 
 
In January 1996, the Committee filed this adversary 
action against Guelich and the Buncher Group to recover 
all payments made pursuant to the 1993 settlement, the 
$300,000 escrow fund, and the $700,000 Ebony Bull note. 
The complaint alleges claims under theories of fraudulent 
conveyance, preferences and subordination. 
 
After a bench trial, the bankruptcy judge found that the 
October 4, 1993 transactions rendered the partnership 
insolvent and that GenFarm IV did not receive fair 
compensation for the Buncher Group limited partnership 
interests. He also determined that between October 1993 
and the petition date, the Buncher Group received 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Other limited partnerships established by Bohn for similar ventures 
also went into bankruptcy. Although some relationships between these 
entities and GenFarm IV existed, they are not material to the issues 
raised on this appeal. 
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$822,851.77 in the initial transfer and in payments on the 
$2.75 million note of GenFarm IV. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court rejected the contention that the 
release of GenFarm IV in the 1993 settlement benefitted the 
partnership, pointing out that the Buncher Group had not 
asserted any claims against GenFarm IV in the state 
litigation. In addition, the Court noted that the retention of 
Bohn as general partner was, if anything, a detriment to 
GenFarm IV, and that the refinancing with the bank that 
was part of the settlement was so restrictive that it did not 
provide a benefit to the partnership. 
 
After analyzing the various elements of the 1993 
settlement agreement, the Bankruptcy Court decided that 
the transaction was voidable under Pennsylvania's Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 39,SS 351- 
63 (repealed Dec. 3, 1993 and replaced by the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.SS 5101- 
10 (effective February 1, 1994)). The Court then considered 
the question of subordination and determined that in the 
circumstances, section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
required that the Buncher Group's claims be subordinated 
to the claims of unsecured creditors. 
 
Having determined that the 1993 settlement was a 
fraudulent conveyance, the Court declared that the note 
and mortgage of that date in the amount of $2.75 million 
were void. The Court directed the Buncher Group to turn 
over to the debtor's estate the $822,851.77 received from 
GenFarm IV pursuant to that note and mortgage, as well as 
the $300,000 in the escrow account and the $700,000 note 
from Ebony Bull. 
 
On appeal, the District Court held that the bankruptcy 
judge did not err in finding that GenFarm IV received no 
benefit from the release of claims by the Buncher Group. 
Further, the Group's limited partnership interest did not 
constitute fair consideration for the cash and note received 
from the 1993 settlement. 
 
The District Court, however, concluded that as a result of 
the settlement, the Buncher Group did not have an equity 
interest in GenFarm IV at the time the Chapter 11 petition 
was filed, and therefore the mandatory subordination 
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provisions of section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code did not 
apply. Consequently, the Court reasoned it was necessary 
to consider equitable subordination under section 510(c). 
 
The District Court also rejected an additional claim 
presented for the first time on appeal by the Buncher 
Group. It had argued it was entitled to a lien for the 
amount transferred to GenFarm IV in the voided fraudulent 
conveyance. Because the Buncher Group had failed to raise 
the issue in the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held 
that the claim for a lien had been waived. The Court, 
therefore, affirmed the judgment in favor of the Committee 
on the fraudulent conversion claim, but reversed and 
remanded on the subordination issue. 
 
On appeal to this Court, the Buncher Group argues that 
the release of claims against GenFarm IV constituted fair 
consideration for the 1993 settlement. In addition, the 
Group contends that the bankruptcy judge erred in not 
considering the value of the partnership interests 
transferred to GenFarm IV and in failing to grant a lien for 
that amount. The Committee filed a cross-appeal from the 
District Court's reversal of the mandatory subordination 
order of the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
I. 
 
The District Court's remand of the subordination issue 
raises an issue of finality that must be considered in 
connection with our appellate authority. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 158(d) to review "final 
decisions, judgments, orders and decrees entered under 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section." Section 158(a) in 
turn authorizes district court review of final and 
interlocutory orders of bankruptcy judges. The Bankruptcy 
Court's disposition of the adversary proceeding here was 
unquestionably final, but the District Court's order is not 
so readily categorized. 
 
Based on pragmatic considerations unique to this area of 
the law, we have traditionally applied a relaxed standard of 
finality in bankruptcy cases. United States Trustee v. 
Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 166 F.3d 552, 556 (3d 
Cir. 1999). Under this standard, a partial remand by the 
 
                                6 
  
District Court does not automatically bar us from 
considering an appeal. Id. 
 
In deciding whether this Court has jurisdiction, four 
factors are pertinent: 
 
       (1) The impact on the assets of the bankrupt estate; 
 
       (2) Necessity for further fact-finding on remand; 
 
       (3) The preclusive effect of our decision on the merits 
       of further litigation; and 
 
       (4) The interest of judicial economy. 
 
Official Committee v. Westmoreland County MH/MR., 183 
F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 1999). The most important of these 
factors is the impact on the bankruptcy estate. In re 
Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Meyertech 
Corp., 831 F.2d 410, 414 (3d Cir. 1987). See also Commerce 
Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 
1993) (discussing finality); In re Porter, 961 F.2d 1066, 
1072 (3d Cir. 1992) (same). 
 
A passing glance at the parties' contentions in this appeal 
reveals that a major effect on the estate's assets is at stake. 
As a result of the Bankruptcy Court's determination, any 
substantial recovery by the unsecured creditors will be 
affected by the outcome of this appeal. Furthermore, 
because the record from the trial has been fully developed, 
it appears unlikely that additional fact-finding would be 
required in the Bankruptcy Court. From a pragmatic 
standpoint, resolution of this matter must be made at some 
point, and expeditious disposition would best serve the 
interests of all concerned. We therefore conclude that we 
should review the appeal at this juncture. 
 
II. 
 
Our standard of review is set out in Universal Minerals, 
Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981). 
In assessing the trial court's ruling, we apply the clearly 
erroneous test to narrative facts and plenary review to 
questions of law. Id. Ultimate facts are examined by 
applying the appropriate standards to the factual and legal 
components. Id. 
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The Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee in a 
bankruptcy proceeding "may avoid any transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred 
by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a 
creditor holding an unsecured claim . . . ." 11 U.S.C. 
S 544(b) (1979). In this case, the applicable law is that of 
Pennsylvania as set out in the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, and 
the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.3See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 39, 
S 361; 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5110; Golder v. Bogash, 
188 A. 837, 838 (Pa. 1937). 
 
The purpose of fraudulent conveyance law is to make 
available to creditors those assets of the debtor that are 
rightfully a part of the bankruptcy estate, even if they have 
been transferred away. See In re Cybergenics Corp., No. 99- 
5592, 2000 WL 1257270, at *3-4 (3d Cir. 2000). When 
recovery is sought under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, any recovery is for the benefit of all unsecured 
creditors, including those who individually had no right to 
avoid the transfer. 2 Collier Bankruptcy Manual  P 544.09[5] 
(Lawrence P. King ed., 3d ed. rev. 1999). The remedy in this 
section adopts the longer "reach-back" provisions of state 
law. Id. P 544.09[2]. 
 
Under section 4 of Pennsylvania's Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, a conveyance made or obligation incurred 
by a person who thereby becomes insolvent is fraudulent as 
to creditors, regardless of intent, if the transaction is 
without fair consideration. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 39,S 354. 
Section 5 provides that when a person in business conveys 
assets without fair consideration and receives so little in 
return that the remaining capital is unreasonably small, 
the transaction is fraudulent as to creditors. Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 39, S 355. Like section 4, section 5 does not consider 
intent. Id. 
 
Fair consideration is given when property of a fair 
equivalent is transferred in good faith. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
39, S 353(a). A party lacks good faith if it knows that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The parties do not contend that the differences between the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Fraudulent Transfer Act affect the 
outcome in the present case. 
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transaction would render the other party insolvent. Id.; 
United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 
1296 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
Section 4 refers to insolvency immediately before the 
conveyance or it can mean "present insolvency after the 
conveyance as affected by it." Angier v. Worrell, 31 A.2d 87, 
89 (Pa. 1943). In Larrimer v. Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 353 
(Pa. 1963), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act encompassed 
insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, i.e., a negative net 
worth; and also in the equity sense, i.e., the debtor has 
insufficient presently salable assets to pay existing debts as 
they come due. 
 
The primary inquiry under a constructive fraud provision 
is limited to whether there is a link between the challenged 
conveyance and the debtor's insolvency. If insolvency is 
established, the burden shifts to the transferee to show 
that the assets were transferred for fair consideration. 
Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The bankruptcy judge in this case heard conflicting 
expert testimony on whether GenFarm IV was rendered 
insolvent by the October 1993 transaction. He analyzed the 
evidence at some length in his opinion and concluded that 
GenFarm IV "was insolvent on October 4, 1993, or became 
insolvent as a result of the closing on the Settlement 
Agreement." 
 
The Buncher Group does not frontally assault the 
insolvency findings. Instead, it argues that the bankruptcy 
judge erred in failing to properly evaluate the consideration 
the Buncher Group furnished to GenFarm IV in the 
settlement. In that connection, the Group says that it 
released the partnership from viable claims worth in excess 
of $9 million. 
 
In its brief, the Buncher Group states that "the 
Committee stipulated that a fraud was being perpetrated on 
the [Buncher Group]. Thus, it is entirely uncontradicted 
that the [Buncher Group] had valid, viable claims against 
GenFarm IV, which they released." The record, however, 
does not bear out this statement. During the trial, some 
discussion took place about the fraud issues asserted in 
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the state litigation by the Buncher Group. The bankruptcy 
judge stated, "I think you will all agree that the [Buncher 
Group] defendants here believe that Rodney Bohn was 
guilty of fraud in formulating and operating this limited 
partnership." Committee counsel replied, "And, as I said, 
Your Honor, we will stipulate that they believe that." This 
exchange is far from a concession that the Buncher Group 
had viable claims against GenFarm IV, whatever might 
have been the circumstances with respect to claims against 
Bohn. 
 
The Buncher Group also argued in the Bankruptcy Court 
that part of the $3.5 million it received was in return for 
releasing claims against the partnership not asserted in the 
state suit. The Buncher Group suggested that the 
subsequent sale of the limited partnership interest by 
GenFarm IV to Ebony Bull for $1.705 million on the closing 
date established the value of those interests. The Buncher 
Group pointed out that it received $3.5 million when it 
conveyed those same interests to the partnership. 
Accordingly, it argued the difference between the two 
figures was some measure of the value of the Buncher 
Group's release of claims against GenFarm IV. 
 
Although somewhat persuasive on its face, this argument 
fails when the terms of the settlement agreement are 
examined closely. The settlement was based on the premise 
that the Buncher Group and Bohn would go their separate 
ways. Between the June agreement date and the October 
closing day, Bohn was forced to choose between buying out 
the Buncher Group, or turning over his interests in the 
partnership. As counsel for the Buncher Group stated at 
oral argument before this Court, "the way we[settled the 
case] we did not know who [was] going to wind up with 
control of this partnership, but whoever does, that's it. . . . 
Everyone has to go their separate ways." 
 
Significantly, the $3.5 million obligation agreed to by 
Bohn under the buyout option was his alone, although he 
was free to assign it to anyone, including GenFarm IV. 
Sometime later, but before the October closing date, Bohn 
opted to assign to GenFarm IV the right to buy the Buncher 
Group shares. 
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Thus, the $3.5 million clearly was not based in part on 
any previously unasserted claims against the partnership. 
The $3.5 million figure was agreed upon in negotiations 
between the Buncher Group and Bohn on his own behalf. 
If the $3.5 million figure represented any claims other than 
the value of the Buncher Group's partnership interest, 
these would have been claims against Bohn, not against 
GenFarm IV. 
 
If Bohn had not assigned his obligation to GenFarm IV, 
the Buncher Group would still have received the $3.5 
million and the partnership would have owed nothing to the 
Buncher Group. Whatever Bohn's motives for transferring 
his obligation to GenFarm IV, the assignment does not 
establish the Buncher Group's contention that a portion of 
the $3.5 million represents payment for claims against 
GenFarm IV. 
 
The Buncher Group failed to persuade the bankruptcy 
judge that it had viable claims at the time of the settlement 
in any amount, let alone $9 million, a figure which included 
treble damages under a theoretical RICO claim. In 
dismissing the Buncher Group's arguments, the 
bankruptcy judge observed that it had not presented any 
claim against GenFarm IV in the state litigation, but that 
its fire had been directed solely at Bohn, not the 
partnership. 
 
Neither the Bankruptcy Court nor this Court disputes the 
Buncher Group's contention that a release of a claim not in 
suit may serve as consideration for a settlement, but the 
Group failed to establish the reality of such claims. On this 
record, the unasserted claims may fairly be considered non- 
existent. Consequently, the bankruptcy judge properly 
found that no part of the consideration received by the 
Buncher Group represented compensation for release of 
claims against the partnership. 
 
In scrutinizing the transfer of the Buncher Group's 
partnership interest, the Bankruptcy Court correctly 
treated the interest of a limited partnership as an equity 
security. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the term "equity 
security" includes the "interest of a limited partner in a 
limited partnership." 11 U.S.C. S 101(16)(B). Citing In re 
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Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir. 1983), the judge 
concluded that a partnership receives less than reasonably 
equivalent value when it redeems the equity interest of its 
principals. Roco held that in determining whether a stock 
redemption is a fraudulent transfer, a transaction in which 
the corporation receives nothing but outstanding stock 
amounts simply to a reduction in capitalization. Id. From 
the perspective of the creditors, there is ordinarily no value 
to the corporation in such an exchange. 
 
The Buncher Group argues that "[u]nder [this] rationale, 
a valid and legitimate settlement between a debtor and an 
equity interest holder, even if it is reached years prior to 
bankruptcy, is subject to being set aside." This objection 
ignores the fact that it is insolvency which cabins the reach 
of fraudulent conveyance law. Therefore, where equity 
shareholders inform themselves of the entity's solvency, 
this concern is allayed. 
 
In effect, what the Buncher Group sought as a result of 
the October 1993 transaction was to transform its failing 
investment into a secured creditor relationship, to the 
detriment of the partnership's unsecured creditors. We 
conclude that the Bankruptcy Court was correct in its 
determination that from the creditors' perspective, the 
partnership did not receive fair consideration. 
 
The Buncher Group also protests the fact that the 
Bankruptcy Court did not award a lien for the value it 
transferred to GenFarm IV. In United States v. Tabor Court 
Realty, 803 F.2d at 1298-99, we cited section 548(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code providing that a transferee or obligee of a 
fraudulent transfer or obligation who takes for value and in 
good faith may retain the interest transferred or the 
obligation incurred. That provision permits a good faith 
transferee or obligee to retain his lien. 
 
We agree with the District Court that the Buncher Group 
waived the lien issue by failing to raise it in the Bankruptcy 
Court. Not only did the Buncher Group neglect to raise the 
issue at trial, but the evidence in the record is insufficient 
to permit a court to realistically value the lien. 
 
III. 
 
We come now to the Committee's cross-appeal 
challenging the District Court's remand of the 
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subordination issue to the Bankruptcy Court. It is helpful 
to put the cross-appeal in context. In the adversary 
proceeding, the Committee sought relief under several 
alternative theories. In its brief at the conclusion of the 
trial, the Committee said, "to the extent that the Committee 
could establish, either through successful prosecution of 
the fraudulent conveyance claim or the equitable 
subordination claim, that such claim was not allowable or 
alternatively, subject to subordination, the escrow fund 
would belong to the estate." In this connection, it is worth 
noting again that the Committee had also sought recovery 
under a preference theory. 
 
The contingent nature of the subordination claim is 
demonstrated in the Committee's response to this Court's 
pre-argument inquiry about appellate jurisdiction. The 
Committee explained that it had pleaded four alternative 
causes of action, three of which were based on theories that 
might have been applied had the fraudulent conveyance 
count failed. "Once the transfer is avoided," the Committee 
wrote, "applicable law mandates Buncher be returned to its 
original status as an equity holder. Such a result affords 
the Committee complete relief in this matter, inasmuch as 
everything received by Buncher in respect of the Transfer 
would be avoided and returned to the Debtor's bankruptcy 
estate." In short, the cross-appeal was a precautionary 
move by the Committee to be considered by this Court only 
if the fraudulent conveyance judgment were reversed; if the 
fraudulent conveyance claim is affirmed, the Committee 
disclaims its cross-appeal. 
 
Once they had upheld the fraudulent conveyance claim, 
the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court need not have 
addressed the subordination count because it was 
academic at that point. In the interest of prudence and 
judicial economy, both courts chose to discuss the issue for 
the benefit of appellate review. This practice is frequently 
followed and is an aid to judicial efficiency. We conclude, 
however, at this juncture that the subordination claim is no 
longer germane and we need not discuss it. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court insofar as it affirms the Bankruptcy Court's ruling on 
the fraudulent conveyance action. We will modify the 
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District Court's remand to the Bankruptcy Court by 
directing that the District Court direct the Bankruptcy 
Court to vacate its order on the subordination claim. 
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